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A DUTY TO REPRESENT? CRITICAL 

REFLECTIONS ON STROPNICKY v. 

NATHANSON 

FOREWORD: OF LEGAL ETHICS, TAXIS, 

AND DOING THE RIGHT THING 

MARTHA MINOW* 
When  Judith  Nathanson,  an  attorney,  declined  Joseph 
Stropnicky's request for legal representation in a divorce, she took 
a stand.  She asserted her commitment to representing only women 
in divorces.  Nathanson could have simply said she was too busy, or 
she did not like Stropnicky's tone of voice,  or otherwise tried to 
duck the case.  By indicating instead a considered judgment against 
representing men, Nathanson opened herself up to a charge of sex 
discrimination.  Stropnicky made that charge, and won before the 
Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination ("MCAD").1 
The editors of this journal have responded by taking their own 
stand.  They do  not advocate  one side  in  the case,  or even one 
strand of argument or issue.  But by devoting a symposium issue to 
the case, they expend their most valuable resource, their pages, on 
the conviction that the case and the issues it raises are worth your 
most valuable resource, your time.  I think they are right. 
As the fascinating and thoughtful symposium contributions in­
dicate, the case raises many issues about the current and potential 
scope and definition of illicit sex discrimination,2 the reach of con­
stitutional freedom of speech and freedom of association defenses? 
*  Professor, Harvard Law School. 
1.  See Stropnicky v. Nathanson, 19 M.D.L.R. (Landlaw, Inc.) 39 (MeAD Feb. 25, 
1997). 
2.  See  Joan Mahoney, Using  Gender as  a Basis of Client Selection:  A  Feminist 
Perspective, 20 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 79 (1998); Sam Stonefield, Lawyer Discrimination 
Against Clients: Outright Rejection-No; Limitations on Issues and Arguments-Yes, 20 
W.  NEW  ENG. L.  REv. 103  (1998). 
3.  See  Leora Harpaz,  Compelled  Lawyer Representation  and  the  Free  Speech 
Rights of  Attorneys, 20 W.  NEW  ENG. L.  REv. 49  (1998); Bruce K. Miller, Lawyers' 
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the special demands of civil  rights lawyering,4 the aspirations and 
realities of legal work,s and the significance of the individual per­
son's identity, beliefs, reputation, and sheer embodiment in the acts 
of legal representation.6  It might initially seem that the presenta­
tion of the issues is imbalanced, given the presence of only one con­
tribution  that  expressly  supports  sanctions  against  Judith 
Nathanson? Yet, the numerous contributions defending Nathanson 
raise and develop arguments against the current law, summarized in 
the decision of the MeAD to sanction Nathanson.  In addition, the 
sheer variety of argument proffered on Nathanson's behalf in this 
symposium  should not be understood as  overwhelming evidence 
that she was right.  Instead, that variety may indicate the basic diffi­
culty in articulating one knock-out argument on her behalf. 
That said, I share the view taken by most of the contributors 
here that as a matter of law, Nathanson should be allowed to tum 
down  Stropnicky based on her commitment to eradicate gender 
bias in the realm of divorce law.  The seemingly varied arguments 
grounded in statutory construction, freedoms of speech and associa­
tion, a plethora of analogies,8 and assessments of what makes law­
yers effective converge9  around a central idea: Lawyers bring too 
much of their own selves to the task of lawyering to be compelled 
to represent any particular individual.  Lawyers  are  not like taxi 
drivers who must take all comers because lawyers transport clients 
with their words, reputations, and personal credibility, not with a 
standard-issue vehicle.  Moreover, any other rule will simply lead to 
less honest (but perfectly lawful) rejections than the one Nathanson 
gave to Stropnicky.  So any other result would promote lies by law­
yers (not exactly what the world needs) and probably insurmounta­
ble  enforcement  difficulties.  In  discussing  the  legality  of client 
Identities,  Client Selection and the Antidiscrimination Principle:  Thoughts on the  Sanc­
tioning ofJudith Nathanson, 20 W. NEW  ENG. L. REv. 93  (1998). 
4.  See James A. Gardner, Section 98 and the Specialized Practice of  Civil Rights 
Law, 20 W. NEW  ENG. L. REv. 39 (1998). 
5.  See  Terri  R.  Day &  Scott L. Rogers,  When  Principled Representation  Tests 
Antidiscrimination Law, 20 W.  NEW ENG. L. REV.  23  (1998). 
6.  See Gabriel J. Chin, Do You Really Want a Lawyer Who Doesn't Want You?, 20 
W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 9 (1998); Chris K. Iijima, When Fiction Intrudes upon Reality: A 
Brief Reply to Professor Chin, 20 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 73 (1998).  All of the articles in 
the symposium deal to some degree with the issues affecting the place of an individual's 
identity and belief in the practice of law. 
7.  See  Stonefield, supra note 2,  at 136. 
8.  See,  e.g., Miller, supra note 3, at 99. 
9.  See,  e.g., Chin, supra note 6,  at 14-15 (arguing that a lawyer who is forced to 
represent a particular client is  unlikely to do a sufficient job). 7  1998]  FOREWORD 
rejection, I mean here only to raise your curiosity, not to end con­
sideration of the legality of the matter.  Read the contributions to 
the symposium, and the MCAD decision; judge for yourself. 
Yet  having concluded, for  myself,  that Nathanson and other 
lawyers should have the ability to select and reject clients based on 
political visions  and personal commitments, I  also  think that Na­
thanson made a mistake in rejecting Stropnicky.  I base this on a 
friendly interpretation of,  or if necessary, amendment to Nathan­
son's own asserted commitments to end gender bias in divorce.  Na­
thanson's view, which I share, is that women's historic roles in the 
family  and the labor market place them at a  disadvantage in  the 
dissolution of marriage under both traditional rules and emerging 
rules that favor gender neutrality.  Traditional rules explicitly con­
fined  women's  claims  to  property  division  and  custody  to  their 
subordinate  status in  the  family  and in  the  workplace.  Current 
rules claiming gender neutrality devalue the disproportionate con­
tribution most women make to making a home and taking care of 
children while also leaving women to the still-unequal opportunities 
in the labor market.1O 
Notice, however, how I felt compelled to write "most women" 
in the last sentence.  It  just is not true that all women do the home­
making and childcare in all families.  To talk or think otherwise is to 
make the same mistake of equating actual individuals with predom­
inant patterns that has generated and perpetuated gender stereo­
types  and  disadvantages  through  time.  It  is  inaccurate  and 
potentially harmful  to  human freedom  to use  the  short-hand of 
"women" when we  actually mean individuals who suffer from the 
confines of a homemaking and child rearing role without receiving 
adequate monetary or other compensation for their work.  That is 
the mistake that feminist theorists have called "essentializing gen­
der."ll  A  strong point of the anti-pornography ordinance drafted 
and unsuccessfully defended by Catherine MacKinnon and Andrea 
Dworkin is its intended protection for men put in the position tradi­
tionally occupied by women.12 
Mr. Stropnicky at least claimed that he fell in the position tra­
ditionally occupied by women in marriage.  He stayed at home, out 
10.  See  MARTHA  ALBERTSON  FINEMAN,  THE  ILLUSION  OF  EQUALITY:  THE 
RHETORIC AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM 4 (1991). 
11.  See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 
STAN. L. REv. 581  (1990). 
12.  See  Catherine  A.  MacKinnon,  Pornography,  Civil  Rights  and  Speech,  20 
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of the economic market; he cared for the house and children.  Per­
haps these were not accurate claims.  Perhaps he could pursue eco­
nomic opportunities after divorce that would not be open to most 
women.  Either of these possibilities would distinguish his situation 
from the position of subordination, the traditional female position 
in marriage, that characterizes Nathanson's concerns in her divorce 
practice, and specific conclusions about them could well justify re­
jecting his request for representation.  Yet failing to pursue his re­
quest to the point of specific conclusions, and treating him as simply 
beyond her scope of concern because of his sex and gender, makes 
the mistake of essentializing gender. . Nathanson should have the 
right to make the mistake, but I think she, and other feminist law­
yers can do better. 
But what will endure about this case, even after all appeals are 
exhausted, is  not a judgment about the wisdom of her choice  or 
even, perhaps, its legality.  What will endure, I hope, is heightened 
reflection about the obligations and demands of lawyering.  We are 
indeed persons when we  provide legal services, and our very per­
sonhood is crucial to both the appearance and reality of legal work. 
Our beliefs, our words, our genders, races, and reputations infuse, 
enable and limit what we can offer those in need of legal help.  We 
sometimes do and always should be able to marshal our very selves 
as lawyers on behalf of causes.  That doing so will on occasion pro­
duce  hard personal and professional choices should make us  act 
with  care,  and  attention  to  the  particular  and  long-term  conse­
quences of our actions. 